Begin Nov. 28, 1961

30.24-2367

A20
ARMS BUDGET (400 UP)
BY PRESTON GROVER

MOSCOW, NOV. 28 (AP)-PRESIDENT KENNEDY, ASSURING THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE THAT NOBODY IS GOING TO INVADE THE SOVIET UNION, DECLARED TODAY THAT THE BASIC THREAT TO WORLD PEACE LIES IN EFFORTS TO COMMUNIZE THE WORLD.

IN AN UNPRECEDENTED INTERVIEW SPREAD ACROSS 10 COLUMNS OF IZVESTIA, THE U.S. CHIEF SAID:

"IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE MERELY SEEKING TO PROTECT ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS, TO PROTECT ITS OWN NATIONAL SECURITY, AND WOULD PERMIT OTHER COUNTRIES TO LIVE AS THEY WISH--TO LIVE IN PEACE--THEN I BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEMS WHICH NOW CAUSE SO MUCH TENSION WOULD FADE AWAY.

"THE SOVIET UNION IS A MIGHTY MILITARY POWER.

"IT HAS GREAT NUCLEAR STRENGTH. IT HAS ROCKETS, AIRPLANES, A GREAT NUMBER OF DIVISIONS. OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH IT. NOBODY WOULD EVER AGAIN INVADE THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS NO SUCH MILITARY FORCE WHICH WOULD BE ABLE TO DO IT. THE QUESTION IS TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL INSURE RECOGNITION OF OUR INTERESTS AS WELL AS YOURS, AND THIS IS UNDOUBTEDLY WITHIN OUR POWER."

THOSE WERE FRESH WORDS TO BE HEARD IN THE SOVIET UNION, SO USED TO HEARING MOSTLY THE SOVIET SIDE ALONE. WHAT IS MORE, THE WORDS WERE PRINTED IN THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT PAPER. IT HAS FOUR MILLION CIRCULATION, WITH AT LEAST A FEW COPIES REACHING EVERY TOWN AND HAMLET IN THE COUNTRY.

KENNEDY EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS IN AN INTERVIEW LAST SATURDAY WITH ALEXEI ADZHUBEI, IZVESTIA EDITOR AND SON-IN-LAW OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV.

CROWDS OF RUSSIANS RUSHED TO BUY COPIES OF THE PAPER AS IT HIT NEWS STANDS.

THE INTERVIEW, INCLUDING COMMENTS BY ADZHUBEI AS KENNEDY WENT ALONG, WAS PRINTED VIRTUALLY INTACT.

THERE WAS NO COMMENT ON IT IN IZVESTIA, BUT THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS, IN A DISPATCH TO BE PRINTED IN OTHER PAPERS, SAID KENNEDY "TRIED TO TAKE COVER BEHIND THE OLD BLIND OF AN IMAGINARY 'COMMUNIST MENACE.'" IT ASSERTED HE GAVE EVASIVE ANSWERS TO SOME OF ADZHUBEI'S QUESTIONS OR DID NOT ANSWER AT ALL.

IT APPEARED THE PRESIDENT DELIBERATELY COUCHED HIS VIEWS IN LOW KEY WITH THE PURPOSE OF GETTING ACROSS THE IDEA THAT THE UNITED STATES IS LOOKING FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS OF THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS AND IS NOT THE AGGRESSIVE IMPERIALISTIC POWER USUALLY DEPICTED HERE.

(THE WHITE HOUSE SAID A COMPARISON WITH THE TRANSCRIPT SHOWED THE INTERVIEW WAS PRINTED IN FULL WITH ONLY ONE ALTERATION AFTER EACH WORD OF THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION HAD BEEN AGREED UPON BY AMERICAN AND SOVIET EXPERTS. THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSLATION HAD ADZHUBEI SAYING THAT "UNFORTUNATELY" THE RESULTS OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1959 "WERE NOT COMPETELY SATISFACTORY." THE IZVESTIA VERSION QUOTED ADZHUBEI: "BUT THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF THAT TRIP WERE WRECKED AND BROUGHT TO NOTHINB BY THE WELL KNOWN ACTIONS OF THE THEN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION.")

THE PRESIDENT MADE THESE POINTS:

BERLIN AND GERMANY ARE THE MOST CRITICAL AREA OF DISPUTE AT PRESENT AND IF THESE PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED, "I BELIEVE WE CAN FIND OUR RELATIONS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED."

HE WAS DISAPPOINTED AT SOVIET RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS "WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN IN PREPARATION FOR MANY MONTHS, AT THE VERY TIME THAT THE CONVERSATIONS WERE GONG ON" FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY AT GENEVA AN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTS COULD LEAD TO OTHER AGREEMENTS ON DISARMAMENT.

A "BASIC DISAGREEMENT" EXISTS OVER DISARMAMENT INSPECTION, BUT THERE MUST BE "AN EFFECTIVE INSPECTION SYSTEM" IF THERE IS TO BE THE GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT WHICH THE RUSSIANS SAY THEY WANT. THIS INSPECTION MUST APPLY NOT JUST TO THE WEAPONS ALREADY DESTROYED BUT ALSO TO WHAT WEAPONS REMAIN.

TO ADZHUBEI'S REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES, THE PRESIDENT SAID: "WE CANNOT NOW WITHDRAW OUR TROOPS FROM EUROPE, WAY BACK ACROSS THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, WHEN YOU MERELY WITHDRAW YOUR TROOPS TO THE SOVIET UNION. WHICH IS ONLY A FEW HUNDRED MILES AWAY."

KENNEDY SAID THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT INTEND TO PERMIT REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY "AND THAT AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION HAS THAT POLICY GERMANY WILL NOT BE REUNIFIED."

THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HOPES "NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS QUICKLY (ON BERLIN AND GERMANY) AND WILL COME TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION."

AS TO ADZHUBEI'S COMMENT THAT SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE IS IN A LAMENTABLE STATE, THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT IF SUCH PROBLEMS AS BERLIN CAN BE SOLVED TO "EASE THE GENERAL TENSION, TRADE WILL THEN INCREASE."

KENNEDY SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WARTIME AGREEMENTS AT YALTA AND POTSDAM PROVIDED FOR A FREE CHOICE BY THE PEOPLES OF EASTERN EUROPE OF A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT BUT "THEY DO NOT, IN OUR OPINION, TODAY, HAVE A FREE CHOICE. YOU MAY ARGUE THAT THEY WANT TO LIVE UNDER COMMUNISM, BUT IF THEY DO NOT, THEY ARE NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHANGE."

COMMENTING ON THE INTERVIEW, TASS SAID KENNEDY ADVANCED NO NEW IDEAS ON BERLIN AND "TRIED TO BELITTLE THE DANGER OF THE GROWING MILITARY THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES" BY WEST GERMANY.

THE TEXT SHOWED THAT ADZHUBEI, IN RESPONSE TO KENNEDY'S COMMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS TO COMMUNIZE THE WORLD, SAID:

"I CANNOT AGREE WITH YOU."

HE SAID THE RECENT 22ND SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS IN MOSCOW ADOPTED A PROGRAM AGAINST THE EXPORTATION OF EITHER REVOLUTION OR COUNTERREVOLUTION.

ADZHUBEI FLEW INTO MOSCOW TONIGHT FROM NEW YORK, ARRIVING IN A SNOWSTORM. HE WAS CLEARLY HAPPY WITH THE AFFAIR. TO FOREIGN NEWSMEN WHO TALKED WITH HIM FOR A BRIEF MOMENT HE SAID: "IT WAS A GOOD INTERVIEW... HOPEFUL."

IT APPEARED THAT DISTRIBUTION OF THE KENNEDY INTERVIEW WILL BE SOMEWHAT LESS THAN THAT ACCORDED MANY KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENTS. TASS, THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY, SAID IT WOULD NOT DISTRIBUTE THE TEXT.

NOVOSTI, A NEWLY ORGANIZED PRESS AGENCY WITH LESS CAPACITY THAN TASS TO REACH THE COUNTRY, SAID IT WILL DISTRIBUTE THE INTERVIEW.

IZVESTIA MADE NO EFFORT TO SINGLE OUT A POINT FOR HEADLINE TREATMENT, AS AN AMERICAN NEWSPAPER WOULD DO. IT SIMPLY STARTED OUT BY SAYING KENNEDY HAD GIVEN ADZHUBEI AN INTERVIEW.

IN ANSWER TO ADZHUBEI'S FIRST QUESTION ON WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, THE PRESIDENT SAID: "WHERE WE FEEL THE DIFFICULTY COMES IS THE EFFORT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO COMMUNIZE, IN A SENSE, THE ENTIRE WORLD."

IN ONE OF HIS FIRST COMMENTS, ADZHUBEI SAID HE HOPED THE PRESIDENT WOULD SAY "THE INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF CUBA WAS A MISTAKE" AND THAT THE PEOPLE OF CUBA, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, BRAZIL AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD BE ALLOWED "TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE."

KENNEDY SAID THAT IN THE CASE OF CUBA, A GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ORIGINALLY SUPPORTED FIDEL CASTRO REVOLUTION BUT CASTRO FAILED TO KEEP HIS PROMISE TO HOLD FREE ELECTIONS.

"THAT IS OUR DISPUTE WITH CUBA," HE SAID.

THE PRESIDENT SAID CHEDDI JAGAN, A MARXIST, RECENTLY WAS ELECTED PRIME MINISTER IN BRITISH GUIANA AND "THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT OBJECT BECAUSE THAT CHOICE WAS MADE BY AN HONEST ELECTION."

ADZHUBEI ASKED KENNEDY TO IMAGINE AN "IMPOSSIBLE THING"--THAT HE HAD BEEN A WORLD WAR II SOVIET NAVY OFFICER AND HOW HE WOULD FEEL IF HE NOW SAW WEST GERMANY BUILDING UP ITS ARMED FORCES.

KENNEDY REPLIED: "IF I WERE A SOVIET VETERAN I WOULD SEE THAT WEST GERMANY NOW HAS ONLY NINE DIVISIONS. WHICH IS A FRACTION OF THE SOVIET FORCES. NINE DIVISIONS. IT HAS NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ITS OWN, IT HAS A VERY SMALL AIR FORCE--ALMOST NO NAVY, I THINK PERHAPS TWO OR THREE SUBMARINES. SO IT IS NOT A MILITARY THREAT. ITS NINE DIVISIONS ARE UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NATO.....

"THEN I WOULD LOOK AT THE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES, AND I WOULD LOOK AT THE POWER OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND I WOULD SAY THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES NOT TO GET INTO A WAR WHICH WOULD DESTROY BOTH OF OUR SYSTEMS.

"AS A SOVIET VETERAN, I WOULD WANT THE SOVIET UNION TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES WHICH RECOGNIZES THE INTERESTS AND THE COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS OUR OWN."

THE PRESIDENT TOLD ADZHUBEI "YOU ARE REALISTS" AND THIS WAS NOT 1939, 1940, OR 1941.

"I WOULD HOPE THAT RATHER THAN ATTEMPTINT TO TALK ABOUT CONDITIONS AS THEY WERE 20 YEARS AGO, WE WOULD LOOK AT THEM AS THEY ARE TODAY. WE HAVE HAD PEACE, REALLY, IN EUROPE FOR 15 YEARS. THE PROBLEM NOW IS TO SEE IF WE CAN REACH A RECOGNITION WHICH CAN SETTLE THIS MATTER FOR ANOTHER 15 YEARS."

THE PRESIDENT SAID THE PROBLEM IN BERLIN WAS TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT TO KEEP A LIMITED NUMBER OF WESTERN TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN AND "TO HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION ON THE AUTOBAHN SO THAT GOODS AND PEOPLE CAN MOVE FREELY IN AND OUT."

IF EAST GERMANY ATTEMPTS TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE ACCESS TO BERLIN, HE SAID, "WE ARE GOING TO HAVE CONTINUED TENSION."

IN VIOLATION OF FOUR-POWER AGREEMENTS, HE SAID, CONTROL OVER EAST BERLIN HAD BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE EAST GERMANS, AND THE SOVIET NOW "SEEKS TO SHARE IN THE CONTROL OF WEST BERLIN."

"TO DIVIDE A COUNTRY, TO DIVIDE A CITY, TO PUT UP A WALL IN A CITY, WE BELIEVE, ONLY INCREASES TENSIONS RATHER THAN DIMINISHES THEM," HE SAID.

KS343PES

A121

TELEGRAPH EDITORS: FOLLOWING IS AN OPTIONAL TOP ON THE KENNEDY-IZVESTIA BUDGET FOR THOSE DESIRING A SECOND DAY APPROACH PEGGED TO REACTION.

- - -

OPTIONAL NIGHT LEAD KENNEDY-IZVESTIA A20 (380)

BY PRESTON GROVER

MOSCOW, NOV. 28 (AP)-PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S INTERVIEW WITH IZVESTIA BLAMING SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO SPREAD COMMUNISM AS THE CAUSE OF WORLD TENSION WAS AN INSTANT BEST-SELLER ON THE STREETS OF MOSCOW TODAY. SOVIET OFFICIALS WERE SILENT ON THE INTERVIEW. FIRST UNOFFICIAL SOVIET REACTION WAS COOL.

HUNDREDS OF RUSSIANS LINED UP IN FRONT OF NEWSSTANDS TO BUY THE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER WHEN IT HIT THE STREETS WITH THE KENNEDY INTERVIEW SPLASHED ACROSS 10 COLUMNS. THE UNPRECEDENTED INTERVIEW KENNEDY GAVE ALEXEI ADZHUBEI, IZVESTIA EDITOR AND SON-IN-LAW OF PREMIER KRUSHCHEV, LAST SATURDAY SHOULD BE AHOT TOPIC OF CONVERSATION FOR DAYS TO COME.

AT LEAST A FEW OF IZVESTIA'S 4 MILLION OR SO DAILY COPIES REACH ALMOST EVERY TOWN AND HAMLET IN THE SOVIET UNION. AND IN RUSSIA, A SINGLE COPY PASSES FROM HAND TO HAND.

IZVESTIA PUBLISHED THE INTERVIEW WITHOUT COMMENT, ITS HEADLINE MERELY NOTING THAT AN INTERVIEW HAD TAKEN PLACE. ADZHUBEI HIMSELF, HOWEVER, WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED AND DESCRIBED IT AS "HOPEFUL."

FIRST EDITORIAL COMMENT CAME FROM THE OFFICIAL SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS.

REPORTING ON THE INTERVIEW, TASS SAID KENNEDY IN DISCUSSING EAST-WEST RELATIONS "TRIED TO TAKE COVER BEHIND THE OLD BLIND OF AN IMAGINARY 'COMMUNIST MENACE'."

KENNEDY, SAID TASS, "CHOOSES" TO BLAME THE SOVIET UNION FOR WHAT HE CALLED "THE AREA OF MOUNTING CRISIS" IN BERLIN AND GERMANY.

"THE EDITOR OF THE SOVIET NEWSPAPER, OF COURSE, DID NOT FAIL TO REMIND THE PRESIDENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS AGAINST ANY EXPORT OF REVOLUTION BUT ALSO AGAINST ANY EXPORT OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION," TASS SAID.

THE SOVIET AGENCY GAVE KENNEDY CREDIT FOR BEING AWARE OF "HOW MUCH THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD DEPENDED ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES."

BUT IT ACCUSED HIM OF EVADING QUESTIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S.-SOVIET PEACE PACT AND THE PROSPECTS OF NORMALIZING TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

KENNEDY, SAID TASS, "ALSO TRIED TO BELITTLE THE DANGER OF THE GROWING MILITARY THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ON THE PART OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (WEST) GERMANY."

(IN COMMUNIST EAST GERMANY, THE OFFICIAL ADN NEWS AGENCY CARRIED A SHARPLY EDITED VERSION OF THE INTERVIEW WITH FEW DIRECT QUOTATIONS. IT MENTIONED KENNEDY'S EXPRESSED HOPE THAT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED THROUGH AN AGREEMENT ON GERMANY AND BERLIN, BUT OMITTED KENNEDY'S REFERENCE TO THE COMMUNIST WALL DIVIDING BERLIN AND OTHER REMARKS ON BERLIN.)

IN THE INTERVIEW, PRINTED VIRTUALLY INTACT IN IZVESTIA, KENNEDY ASSURED THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE NOBODY IS GOING TO INVADE THE SOVIET UNION. KENNEDY SAID:

"IF THE SOVIET X X X THIRD GRAF, A20, DELETING SIXTH THROUGH 10TH GRAPHS, "THOSE WERE FRESH X X X AT ALL."

UK957PES

30.24-2369

*WASHINGTON, Nov. 28 (AP) —Following is the transcript of an interview with President Kennedy by Alekseí I. Adzhubei, editor of Izvestia, as made public by the White House:*

MR. ADZHUBEI — Mr. President, I am happy to get this interview from you, and I would like to tell you quite frankly that your election to the high post of President of the United States office was met with great hope by public opinion in our country. In connection with this, I would like to ask you the following question—

THE PRESIDENT — May I just say that I appreciate very much your coming to the United States. I also appreciate the opportunity to talk, through you and through your newspaper, to the people of the Soviet Union. I think that communication, an exchange of views, an honest report of what our countries are like and what they want and what the people wish, is in the interests of both our countries and in the interests of peace. So we are delighted to have this opportunity.

MR. ADZHUBEI — I would like to ask you the following question. Mr. President, during the election campaign, on several occasions you expressed good intentions with respect to the necessity of improving Soviet-American relations. On the occasion of your inauguration as President of a great country, Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R., and Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R., in their message to you expressed the hope that by their joint efforts our countries can succeed in radically improving our relations and the international situation.

They also expressed confidence that we can, step by step, liquidate the existing suspicion and distrust, and thus bring cooperation between our peoples. On its part, the Soviet Government is always ready to support any good endeavor in that direction, and to do its best for the establishment of a stable peace in the world, in order that all peoples may live in friendship and without hatred among them.

Mr. President, what do you think about the present state of Soviet-American relations, and what in your opinion must be done by the American as well as the Soviet Governments to improve the relations between our two countries.

## President Gives Views On U. S.-Soviet Relations

THE PRESIDENT—Well, I would say that the relations today are not as satisfactory as I had hoped they would be when I first took office. In fact, one of the first things that I did on becoming President was to commit the United States to an earnest effort to achieve a satisfactory agreement with the Soviet Union on the cessation of nuclear tests. As a result of that effort, at the end of March, we sent our representatives, along with Great Britain's, to Geneva for the first time with a complete treaty which we tabled for discussion. I had hoped that this would be one area where we could make real progress. It would lessen the contamination of the air, it would be a first step toward disarmament, and I felt that if we could achieve an agreement in this area, we could then move on to the other areas of disarmament which required action.

We were not successful. And as you know, we were in fact still at the table in Geneva in August when, still negotiating, the Soviet Union resumed its tests, tests which must have been in preparation for many months, at the very time that the conversations were going on. So that was then a disappointment.

In addition, Berlin and Germany have become a third areas of heightened crisis since the Vienna meeting, and I think extremely dangerous to the peace, which I am sure—I know—both of our people want.

I think that the Soviet Union and the United States should live together in peace. We are large countries, energetic people, we are steadily providing in both our countries an increase in the standard of living. If we can keep the peace for twenty years, the life of the people of the Soviet Union and the life of the people of the United States will be far richer and will be far happier as the standard of living steadily rises.

## Communizing of World Is Cited as Key Difficulty

Where we feel the difficulty comes is the effort by the Soviet Union to communize, in a sense, the entire world. If the Soviet Union were merely seeking to protect its own national interests, to protect its own national security, and would permit other countires to live as they wish—to live in peace—then I believe that the problems which now cause so much tension would fade away.

We want the people of the Soviet Union to live in peace—we want the same for our own people. It is this effort to push outward the Communist system, on to country after country, that represents, I think, the great threat to peace. If the Soviet Union looked only to its national interest and to providing a better life for its people under conditions of peace, I think there would be nothing that would disturb the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

MR. ADZHUBEI — That is very interesting. However, as a citizen of the Soviet Union as a member of the Communist party, I cannot agree with you in that part of your answer where you are saying that we are trying to "communize" the world. At the twenty-second party congress, which, in our opinion, was a historic event, we adopted a program of Communist development, and we said that we are against any export of the revolution, but we are also against any export of counter-revolution.

If we turn to facts, there are many countries in the world in the affairs of which, from our point of view, the United States is interfering. Yesterday, I saw a TV program which was being shown to millions of Americans, where your commentator asserted that the whole world is under complete threat of the Communists to capture the world. We would like to see an end put to this situation.

Our Government and our party believe that every people chooses such a system of government as they like. Austria chose the capitalist way of development, although American and Soviet troops were there. But Cuba has chosen another way of development. And we would be happy if you, Mr. President, were to state that the interference in the affairs of Cuba was a mistake. We hope that the Cuban people will consolidate their own way of life—as well as the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Brazil and many other countries.

## U. S. Dispute With Cuba A Matter of Free Elections

THE PRESIDENT—May I just say, without getting into a debate, that the United States supports the idea that every people shall have the right to make a free choice as to the kind of government they want. In the case of Cuba, let me remind you that the Castro revolution was originally supported by the great majority of the people. When Castro was leading the revolution, the statement was made that there would be free elections, and freedom for the people and progress for the people. But Castro has not kept that commitment. Until the present Government of Cuba will allow free and honest elections, in our opinion, it cannot claim to represent the majority of the people. That is our dispute with Cuba.

Mr. [Cheddi] Jagan, on the other hand, who was recently elected Prime Minister in British Guiana, is a Marxist, but the United States doesn't object—because that choice was made by an honest election, which he won.

If the people of any country choose to follow a Communist system in a free election, after a fair opportunity for a number of views to be presented, the United States would accept that. What we find to be objectionable, and a threat to the peace, is when a system is imposed by a small militant group by subversion, infiltration, and all the rest.

If the Soviet Union and this country could develop their own resources, and if you permitted the peoples of the world to develop in the way they wish to develop, then, if any nation should choose a Communist system, we would recognize and accept that. And if they chose another system, then we would hope that you would recognize and accept that, too. If we could get that on both sides, I believe the Soviet Union and the United States, which have so much to gain from peace, could live in peace.

## All Soviet Citizens Described as Politicians

MR. ADZHUBEI — I understand you, Mr. President, and I am very happy to hear these words from you, because as you know, the future of the world depends in many respects on the relations between the United States and our country. Let the people decide what way of development they want to choose. However, I would like to draw your attention to the following historical parallel. When the Bolsheviks, headed by V. I. Lenin, came to power, all the capitalist world was shouting that they were plotters and that there was no freedom in Russia, but in forty-four years our country became a great power. But this is not the issue. I would like to ask you another question.

THE PRESIDENT — You are a newspaper man and a politician.

MR. ADZHUBEI — In our country every citizen is a politician, because we like our country very much. The young and the old like the Socialist system of our country and we are ready to fight for it until its victorious end. You are proud of your country, Mr. President, and we are also very much proud of our own country, and we are very proud of our party, and we are proud of V. I. Lenin.

Mr. President, sometimes it's said that in order to improve the relations between our countries, it is necessary to start with the settlement of small problems. Others believe that too many small issues have accumulated and that perhaps it would be better to start with a big act. We believe that such a big act was the visit by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev to the United States in 1959. But unfortunately the results of that trip were not completely satisfactory. Mr. President, what is your attitude toward the idea of concluding a pact of peace between the United States and the Soviet Union? That would be a great step forward.

## Germany and Berlin Called 'Most Critical Area'

THE PRESIDENT—I think we should have not only an agreement between our countries, but take those steps which make peace possible. I don't think that paper, and words on paper, are as significant as looking at those areas which provide tension between our two systems and seeing if we can dispel that tension.

One of those areas now is the problem of Germany and Berlin. If we could make progress there, then in my opinion it would provide a most important step in improving our relations to other areas.

I stated that if we had been able to get an agreement on the nuclear tests cessation, that would lead to other agreements on disarmament. If we can make an agreement successfully which provides peace in Central Europe, if we can conclude our efforts in Laos and insure a government and country which are neutral and independent, as Chairman Khrushchev and I agreed at Vienna, then we would be able to move into other areas of tension.

I believe, as I have said, if we can now make an agreement on a satisfactory basis on Berlin and Germany, which is the most critical area—because it represents a matter of great interest to both our countries, and great concern to our peoples—then we could take other steps. If we can solve the problem of Germany and Berlin, I believe we can find our relations substantially improved.

MR. ADZHUBEI — Thank you, Mr. President, this is a most worthy thought. Especially because, as I understand you, you intend to talk seriously on these problems with our Government. Let me say that the German problem is of great importance to our country, for many reasons. Not only for strictly political reasons, and not only because of prestige considerations. As you know we have allies—Poland, Czechoslovakia and a number of other countries. However, to date we haven't heard any sober voices from the West affirming the integrity of the borders existing in Europe, and it would be very important to hear that.

## Soviet Representative Cites Russian War Losses

But there is also another aspect to the German problem. In our country, in the Soviet Union, there is not a single family that did not lose some kin in the war. You know we are trying to put out the smoldering coals of the last war in Central Europe. But we do not wish only to play the role of a political fireman, as it were, though it is very important. In the heart of every Soviet citizen, in the soul of every Soviet citizen, there are, as you know, coals still burning from the last war, and they are burning his soul and do not let him sleep quietly. Thus, solution of the question of a peace treaty is the hope and tranquillity in the heart of every Soviet man. After all, we are still singing songs about those who did not come home from the war. I know that you participated in the war, that you are a hero of the war, and this is why I am talking to you in such lofty words. But this, if you wish, is a sideline.

Mr. President, in 1958, if I am not mistaken, our Government suggested to the Government of the United States—of course, the previous Administration was in power then—that the trade relations between our countries be normalized. Now, as you know, the trade relations between our countries are in a very lamentable condition. Before I left for the United States, I had a conversation with my friends from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and they asked me to inquire from you whether there are any prospects of improving the trade relations between our countries. After all there is a very old truth: together with goods, together with the exchange of goods, there also come better relations among peoples.

THE PRESIDENT — Let me say that I know that the Soviet Union suffered more from World War II than any country. It represented a terrible blow, and the casualties affected every family, including many of the families of those now in government.

I will say that the United States also suffered, though not so heavily as the Soviet Union, quite obviously. My brother was killed in Europe. My sister's husband was killed in Europe.

The point is that that war is over now. We want to prevent another war arising out of Germany. I think the important thing between the United States and the U. S. S. R. is not to create the kind of tension and pressure which in the name of settling World War II increases the chances of a conflict between the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other. What we should attempt to do is work out a solution through negotiation which will make it possible to keep the peace in Central Europe. And that is the aim of this government.

## 'Symbolic' Step by U. S. To Ease Trade Is Recalled

Now in regard to trade, one of the first things I did on becoming President was to change governmental policy which provided for the admission of crab meat. This was not a matter of great dollar value, but had some symbolic importance, and was a matter which Chairman Khrushchev had spoken about on several occasions.

My own judgment is that if we can solve the problems that we are now talking about, particularly in Berlin, and ease the general tension, trade will then increase. What has diminished trade in recent months has been the difficulty which we have experienced in Germany and Berlin. I would hope that trade could be expanded, and in my judgment it would expand immediately, if we can bring about a peaceful and satisfactory solution to the interests of all in Germany and Berlin.

MR. ADZHUBEI—I shall communicate your words to our readers with a feeling of satisfaction. We have always thought and still think of the Americans as the realists. It is your energy, your realistic approach, that has helped you to create such a wealthy country. But now I would like to ask you frankly, Mr. President, because this idea was expressed by you in several instances, whether you seriously think that the social changes which are happening in the world today are the result of actions in which Moscow has its hands.

I would like to remind you of one thing. You know, in France when the bourgeois revolution won, the aristocratic Europe accused France of every mortal sin. When the October Revolution won, all the world of the rich condemned that revolution. But this revolution won! You mentioned that a Marxist came to power in British Guiana. Do you think that events occurred there according to our instructions? Of course, we can't give you any assurances that there won't be social changes in the world, although you will call it the result of the "hands" of Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT — Let me say, as I indicated, if the people of these countries make a free choice, that they prefer the Communist or Socialist or any other kind of system, then the United States and the people of the United States accept that. That is why I give the example of British Guiana.

But of course I do not hold and I do not say that the Soviet Union is responsible for all the changes that are coming in the world. For example, since the end of World War II, the British Empire has been turned into independent states, I think fifteen of them. The French Community has been turned into twenty-one independent states. There are many changes in the world. Western Europe has joined closer together in the Common Market.

These are not the result of the Communists' efforts. There are many changes, as I have said, throughout the world. People want to live in different ways. That is what we want, also. If they have a fair opportunity to make a choice, if they choose to support communism, we accept that.

What we object to is the attempt to impose communism by force, or a situation where once a people may have fallen under communism, the Communists do not give them a fair opportunity to make another choice.

## Communist Regimes Said to Deny Free Choice

We had been under the impression that the Yalta agreement and the Potsdam agreement provided for a free choice for the peoples of Eastern Europe. They do not, in our opinion, today, have a free choice. You may argue that they may want to live under communism, but if they do not, they are not given the opportunity to change.

We believe that if the Soviet Union — without attempting to impose the Communist sys-

tem — will permit the people of the world to live as they wish to live, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States will then be very satisfactory, and our two peoples, which now live in danger, will be able to live in peace and with a greatly increased standard of living. And I believe we have such vast economic opportunities now in both of our countries that we should consider how we can get along and not attempt to impose our views, one on the other or on anyone else.

MR. ADZHUBEI—Of course, Mr. President, I do not expect in such a short period of time I would succeed in converting you to another belief — just as you did not expect to convert me. You have talked with our Chairman, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, and he did not succeed in convincing you, nor did he try to do so.

This, as you know, is a matter of personal outlook. One man may consider certain elections to be free, while another would consider those elections nondemocratic. For example, in a number of countries of Latin America, great revolutionary changes are taking place. For a long period of time you considered that [Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas] Trujillo was elected in a democratic way.

You have been saying the same about the regime of the Shah of Iran as well. But let us not engage in an argument and let us turn to the next question.

Mr. President, may I ask you the following question? It is well known that the Soviet Government has declared its readiness to accept any proposal of the Western powers on international control and inspection, if agreement on general and complete disarmament is reached. At the same time, the Soviet Government does not exclude the possibility of reaching agreement on a number of measures which may decrease the danger of war and which could be effected in the nearest future.

Such proposals are, for instance, the proposals on the freezing of military budgets, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, or measures against the danger of surprise attack.

What, in your views, are the prospects of general and complete disarmament, and of decreasing international tensions?

THE PRESIDENT—Inasmuch as the Soviet Union and the United States agreed in the declaration of principles in September, at the end of the McCloy-Zorin talks, on the goal of general and complete disarmament, the problem now becomes an attempt to implement that goal, stage by stage.

The Soviet Union and the United States have a basic disagreement which must be resolved on this question. We believe that there must be adequate inspection, to make sure that each side is disarming and staying in accordance with the agreements which they make. The Soviet Union has stated that it will permit us, or the international body, to inspect those weapons which are destroyed but will not permit us to carry out an inspection to see what weapons remain. One side could destroy 100 bombers but still have 1,000 or 2,000 bombers left.

## Inspection of All Arms Is Termed Necessary

If you are really going to provide for orderly disarmament it seems to me you have to inspect not only those weapons which have been destroyed but also these weapons that remain. Otherwise we do not have any guarantee of security for either side. If we can agree to an effective inspection system so that each country can know that the other is living up to its agreement, then, in my opinion, we can move into general and complete disarmament.

That is why I thought it so vitally important that we make an agreement on cessation of nuclear testing as the first step, and then proceed step by step through atomic weapons, through missiles, through the level of ground forces, the navy, and all the rest. If we can get agreement on that, then we can move toward general and complete disarmament.

I think it would be helpful if NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a commitment to live in peace with each other. I certainly believe we should take every conceivable step to prevent surprise attack. I believe that if the relations between our countries can be normalized, there will be less military build-up on both sides, but we cannot now withdraw our troops from Europe, way back across the Atlantic Ocean, when you merely withdraw your troops to the Soviet Union, which is only a few hundred miles away.

That is why we need some understanding of what is going to be the situation in Berlin and in Germany. And that is why I hope negotiations will take place between our Governments quickly and will come to a successful conclusion.

The statement has been made on many occasions that we object to the signing of a peace treaty, that we regard that as a belligerent act. That is not the point. It is our view that the statement which the four powers made at Geneva in 1955 providing for the reunification of Germany represents the soundest policy.

To divide a country, to divide a city, to put up a wall in a city, we believe, only increases tensions rather than diminish them. And we believe that, if the German people were permitted to be reunified, adequate steps could be taken to protect the security of all involved.

## Signing of Pact Viewed As Step to Raise Tension

Now we recognize that today the Soviet Union does not intend to permit reunification, and that as long as the Soviet Union has that policy Germany will not be reunified. The question now is whether the Soviet Union will sign a treaty with the East German authorities which will increase tension rather than diminish it.

As I said in my speech at the United Nations, we recognize that the Soviet Union can sign any treaty it wishes with the East German authorities. What we find to be so dangerous, however, is the claim that that treaty will deny us our rights in West Berlin, rights which we won through the war, rights which were agreed to by the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France at the conclusion of the war, and which we believe should be continued.

But if you sign a treaty with East Germany and those rights are subject to the wishes of the East German authorities, it seems to me that that is going to increase tension. If the Soviet Union attempts in that treaty to turn over jurisdiction over West Berlin to the East German authorities, against the wishes of the people of West Berlin — if the lines of communication and access, from West Berlin to the outside world and the West, are completely under the control of East German authorities to cut any time they so wish—then this treaty does not bring peace, it only increases the danger.

Now I am hopeful that, in the conversations and negotiations which we hope to have with the Soviet Union, assurances will be given which will permit us to continue to exercise the rights which we now have in West Berlin, as a result of the existing four-power agreement, and will permit free access in and out of the city.

We do not want to stay in West Berlin if the people there do not want us to stay. But they want us to stay. When they decide that they don't want us, we will leave. But as long as they wish us to stay, it seems to me that the rights which are ours by agreement should be maintained.

I am hopeful that the Soviet Union will agree with this, and in particular will agree to permit supplies and people to move in and out of West Berlin freely. Then we can, in my opinion, reach a peaceful settlement in the center of Europe, and if we can reach an agreement on this question, then I believe our relations will greatly improve.

MR. ADZHUBEI — You just answered the question I was going to ask. But I cannot agree with you. I am not a specialist in the field of disarmament, but as I understand it, the McCloy-Zorin agreement was a very important step forward, and we hope that the efforts by specialists who will be authorized by our Governments will lead to better results.

And now a few words about Germany. If I understand correctly the translation, I have heard a very unrealistic term. I have in mind the term "East German authorities." It would be more pleasant to hear "Government of the German Democratic Republic."

You don't like the German Democratic Republic. We don't like the Federal Republic of Germany, but we have diplomatic relations with the F. R. G., we have very good trade relations with it. Thus, we are realists. If the Government of the United States were not saying "East German authorities" but were to say "Government of the G. D. R.," that would be very good and realistic.

## Guarantees of 'Freedom' For West Berlin Proposed

And now a second point. We would like to sign a peace treaty together with our World War II allies, and we hope that it will be so. It would be a great happiness not only for our Government but also for our people.

Nobody intends to turn West Berlin over to East Germany. That does not make sense. There is the G. D. R. and there is the F. R. G. with its capitalist system. Let's sign a peace treaty and let us guarantee freedom for West Berlin by every means — by troops of the four powers, by United Nations troops — and let's thus guarantee its rights. But this is a problem for future negotiation.

Now a few words about access to West Berlin. Why complicate such a simple problem? Communication to West Berlin runs over 100 miles through the territory of the German Democratic Republic. If one needs to visit West Berlin, if it is necessary to send people, food or other goods there, then it is very elementary to ask permission for that of the Government of the G. D. R. Sometimes I feel — and I am saying this to you very frankly — that some evil people are attempting to complicate simple things and thus are deliberately creating tension.

Yesterday, when I was talking with your closest advisers, I gave this example: If a man has his nervous system extremely strained, he is irritated by every noise, every sound and everything is taken by him very suspiciously. Such a man can create much trouble. We hope that the negotiations which will take place in the near future will be objective, realistic and will be conducted in an atmosphere of complete calm.

THE PRESIDENT — May I just make one brief response? All Berlin was put under four-power authority by the agreements at Potsdam. East Berlin, which was under the immediate authority of the Soviet Union, has now been turned over to East Germany in violation of those agreements. It is no longer effectively under four-power control. And now the Soviet Union seeks to place Soviet troops in West Berlin. It does not suggest that the troops of the other three powers be placed in East Berlin.

In other words, the Soviet Union now seeks to share in the control of West Berlin. That is the first point that is in question. The second is this question of the rights of access in crossing East Germany. As I gather it, you would give the East German authorities — you say East German Government — the power to interfere with that traffic. It is stated that they would not do so, but we have no assurances in Mr. Ulbricht's statements, which vary from week to week.

## Warning Given on Danger Of Curbs on Access

In my opinion, if such an agreement is signed, if our rights on the communication lines between the West and West Berlin—which are now governed by the Soviet Union—are turned over to the East German authorities, and if the East Germans should interfere with that right of access, for one reason or another, then this would provide for heightened tension, the Soviet Union might come to the support of East Germany and we would find ourselves, instead of having settled this now, once more face-to-face.

The reason why we have been reluctant to recognize East Germany as a sovereign power is that we do not recognize the division of Germany. In our opinion the German people wish to have one united country. If the Soviet Union had lost the war, the Soviet people themselves would object to a line being drawn through Moscow and the entire country. If we had been defeated in war, we wouldn't like to have a line drawn down the Mississippi River. The Germans want to be united. I think it should be possible to provide for that under conditions which protect the interests of all concerned. But the Soviet Union believes that it is more in their interest to keep Germany divided.

Now the question is—given that decision—can we provide for the protection of our rights in West Berlin, which were agreed to in 1945 by the Soviet Union, so that this is not a continuing crisis? In attempting to work out a solution of the problems which came about as a result of World War II, we don't want to increase the chances of World War III. All we wish to do is maintain a very limited—and they are a very limited—number of troops of the three powers in West Berlin and to have, for example, an international administration on the autobahn so that goods and people can move freely in and out.

Then we can have peace in this area for years. But if East Germany is going to exercise the right of authority over that access, we are going to have continued tension there—and I simply do not see, given the strong interests of both of us in having peace in this part of Europe, why that is a wise decision. I am hopeful instead that the negotiations which we are anxious to see take place will bring about an agreement on this area which will recognize fairly the interests of all.

## Russians' Bitterness Against Germany Cited

MR. ADZHUBEI—Mr. President, since I'm talking to you in a very frank and friendly manner, I would like to ask you to imagine, at least for a moment, the following impossible thing. Imagine that you were an officer, a veteran of the Soviet Navy, who fought in World War II. You won the war, and then the very events occurred which are now taking place. One of the parts of Germany—the Federal Republic of Germany — does not recognize the borders which have been established after the war. It is again building up its armed forces.

The Chancellor of that country goes to the United States to talk to the President of the United States and they have secret talks. The spirit of revanchism is very high in that part of Germany. What would your attitude be toward this, if you were a veteran of the Soviet Navy?

THE PRESIDENT — If I were a Soviet veteran, I would see that West Germany now has only nine divisions, which is a fraction of the Soviet forces. Nine divisions. It has no nuclear weapons of its own. It has a very small air force—almost no navy, I think perhaps two or three submarines. So it is not a military threat. Its nine divisions are under the international control of NATO, and subject to the command of the NATO organization, which is made up of fifteen countries of Europe, which altogether have, in West Germany now, about twenty-two or twenty-three divisions—about the same number as the Soviet divisions in East Germany.

So that I do not see that this country represents a military threat now to the Soviet Union, even though I recognize how bitter was the struggle in World War II — in the same way that Japan today represents no threat to the United States, even though twenty years ago there were four years of war in the Pacific against the Japanese. The power of countries changes—weapons change — science changes —without missiles, without nuclear capability, with very few divisions today, I don't believe West Germany is a military threat.

Then I would look at the

Cont'd on Following Page

power of the United States, and I would look at the power of the Soviet Union, and I would say that the important thing is for the Soviet Union and the United States not to get into a war, which would destroy both of our systems. So as a Soviet veteran, I would want the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with the United States which recognizes the interests and the commitments of the United States, as well as our own, and not attempt to enforce single-handedly a new situation upon the United States which would be against previous commitments we had made. The Soviet Union made a commitment in regard to Berlin in 1945. Germany today is divided. Germany today is not a threat to the Soviet Union militarily.

## Accord Suiting Both Sides In Germany Held Possible

The important thing is to attempt to reach an accord which recognizes the interests of all; and I believe that can be done with respect to Germany. I recognize that there are going to be two Germanys as long as the Soviet Union believes that that is in her interest. The problem now is to make sure that, in any treaty which the Soviet Union reaches with East Germany, the rights of the other powers are recognized in Berlin. That's all we're talking about. We are not talking about encouraging revanchism, building a great German military machine, or anything else you mention. In any peace treaty which is signed with East Germany, there must be a recognition of the rights of the United States and the other powers.

Now that does not seem to me to be a threat in any way to the security of the Soviet Union. That does not provide for any increase in the Western military forces, which are rather limited there. I think we could have peace in this century in Central Europe if we can reach an accord over West Berlin. To pursue another course in the name of ending World War II—a course which threatens to increase the chance of World War III — represents a wholly unwise policy, for you and for us.

So, if I were a Soviet officer and wanted peace, I would think peace can be won and my country's security can be assured. The Soviet Union is a strong military power. It has great nuclear capacity. It has missiles, planes—it has a great number of divisions — it has countries associated with it. No one is ever going to invade the Soviet Union again. There is no military power that can do that. The problem is to make an agreement which will permit us to have our interests recognized, as well as yours. That should not be beyond the capacity of us both.

Chairman Khrushchev did not, nor did I, make the ar-

rangements in 1945 in regard to Berlin. Our responsibility, given the situation which is a difficult one, is to bring about peace, and I believe it can be done.

In short, if I were a Soviet naval officer, I would feel that the security of the Soviet Union was well protected, and that the important thing now is to reach an accord with the United States, our ally during that second war.

### Question of Atom Arms For Bonn Regime Raised

MR. ADZHUBEI — Mr. President, I am about to finish. Of course, you answered this question not as a veteran of the Soviet armed forces but as President of the United States, and that is quite natural. However, as I understand you, Mr. President, you are against West Germany's having nuclear weapons at her disposal, or in any degree of control over such weapons?

THE PRESIDENT — The United States, as a matter of national policy, as I said at the United Nations, will not give nuclear weapons to any country, and I would be extremely reluctant to see West Germany acquire a nuclear capacity of its own. Chancellor Adenauer stated that they would not, in 1954. That is still the policy of that Government, and I think that is the wise policy.

MR. ADZHUBEI—But you know perfectly well that many top posts in NATO are occupied by German generals, and you know that Europe is very far from the United States. Don't you think that at some point it might happen that German generals might become too influential in NATO?

THE PRESIDENT—That is why I believe it to be so important to stress the West German Army is integrated in NATO. NATO is now commanded by an American; and, in my judgment, as long as German forces are integrated in NATO —and NATO is under the control of the fifteen NATO countries, none of which wants another war—there is security for all. And I think that will continue.

Now if this situation changed, if Germany developed an atomic capability of its own, if it developed many missiles, or a strong national army that threatened war, then I would understand your concern, and I would share it. After all, we have had two wars in Europe, as well as you.

But the situation today, and the situation for the future, is as I have described it. If it changed, then it would seem to me appropriate for the United States and the Soviet Union and others to consider the situation at that time. But it is not that way now, so why take the risk of having the United States, which is a powerful country, and the Soviet Union, which is also powerful, getting into difficulty with each other, when there is no real threat in Europe to you or to us. I think that we should look at things as they are in 1961.

### Chance of Nuclear War Termed Major Danger

You have stated that you are realists. This is not 1939, 1940 or 1941. Look what has happened. As I said, in the Far East, Japan's strength was entirely different in those years. China's power was also entirely different. Countries change. Situations change. And we have to be realistic enough to see where the real danger lies. The real danger today is the fact that both of us possess in our nuclear stockpiles the means to impose great devastation upon each other — and we are the ones that have the most to lose from war.

Therefore I think, if we look at it realistically, we should be able to reach an accord which protects the interests of our two great countries, and permits us both to go ahead with increasing our standard of living and meeting other problems. In the United States in the last fourteen years our living standard has increased 40 per cent. In the Soviet Union it has gone up sharply. Nobody can benefit more from peace than the Soviet Union and the United States.

I would hope that rather than attempting to talk about conditions in Germany as they were twenty years ago, we would look at them as they are today. We have had peace, really, in Europe for fifteen years. The problem now is to see if we can reach a negotiation which can settle this matter for another fifteen years. Nobody knows what is going to happen in the world over the long run, but at least we ought to be able to settle this matter of Berlin and Germany.

MR. ADZHUBEI — I thank you for your attention and this time that I took from your week-end rest.

THE PRESIDENT — I appreciate very much your giving me, as President, this opportunity to talk to the people of the Soviet Union, and your courtesy in coming here. I want to emphasize that to the people of this country there is nothing that would satisfy them more than to see the two countries live at peace, and the people of the two countries enjoying a steadily increasing standard of living.

I was in the Soviet Union as a student in 1939, and I understand that there have been many changes, and that the standard of living of the people is rising. The standards of the people of the United States have also risen. I am hopeful that this interview will contribute in some degree to better understanding and to peace. For, I repeat again, our two peoples have the most to gain from peace.

MR. ADZHUBEI — Thank you, Mr. President.

ASIWA (DIVS&BUT)
(650)
AMS BUDGET

NIGHT LEAD INTERVIEW INTERPRETIVE

BY JOHN M. HIGHTOWER

WASHINGTON, NOV. 28 (AP)-PRESIDENT KENNEDY GAVE TWO CLUES TODAY TO ALLIED POLICY PLANNING FOR THE POSSIBLE NEGOTIATION OF A BERLIN SOLUTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S SON-IN-LAW, ALEXEI ADZHUBEI, PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW AND RELEASED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, KENNEDY DISCLOSED:

1. THE WESTERN POWERS ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER "AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION" ON THE AUTOBAHN LINKING WEST BERLIN WITH WEST GERMANY SO "THAT GOODS AND PEOPLE CAN MOVE FREELY IN AND OUT."

2. IT COULD BE CONSIDERED HELPFUL FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE SOVIET-LED WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO MAKE "A COMMITMENT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH EACH OTHER."

ON ONE OTHER POINT KENNEDY POSSIBLY THREW OUT A HINT OF WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IF IT IS A POINT THAT INTERESTS THE SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR DEMANDS ON BERLIN. HE SAID WHAT THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND FRANCE WANT TO DO IS MAINTAIN "A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF TROOPS OF THE THREE POWERS IN WEST BERLIN."

IT THUS APPEARED THAT KENNEDY DELIBERATELY USED THE ADZHUBEI INTERVIEW TO DROP SOME NEGOTIATING HINTS FOR KHRUSHCHEV'S ATTENTION AND CONSIDERATION.

30.24-2371

KENNEDY SAID IN A STATEMENT AFTER THE INTERVIEW WAS PUBLISHED THAT HE CONSIDERED ITS PUBLICATION IN THE SOVIET UNION "A MARKED STEP FORWARD IN AMERICAN-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING."

IT WAS NOTED HERE THAT A CHECK BY THE U. S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW SHOWED NO CHANGES OF CONSEQUENCE IN THE TEXT OF KENNEDY'S REMARKS, AS PRINTED IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER IZVESTIA. THE ONLY CHANGE OF ANY SUBSTANCE WAS IN A PASSAGE WHERE ADZHUBEI REFERRED TO KHRUSHCHEV'S AMERICAN VISIT IN 1959.

IN THE U. S. VERSION ADZHUBEI MERELY SAID RESULTS OF THE VISIT WERE NOT "COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY," BUT AS PRINTED IN HIS NEWSPAPER THIS WAS CHANGED TO READ THAT "THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF THAT TRIP WERE WREKCED AND BROUGHT TO NOTHING BY THE WELL KNOWN ACTIONS OF THE THEN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION."

INQUIRY IN OFFICIAL QUARTERS HERE BROUGHT THE INFORMATION THAT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR THE AUTOBAHN IS PRESENTLY FLEXIBLE BUT IN GENERAL WOULD FOLLOW THE LINE OF A PORT OR RIVER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AS IT MIGHT OPERATE IN THE UNITED STATES WHEN THE INTERESTS OF SEVERAL STATES AND CITIES WERE INVOLVED.

DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS SAID THIS WOULD MEAN IN THE FIRST INSTANCE A FIRM AGREEMENT AMONG UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE AUTOBAHN WOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE AS A CORRIDOR FOR WESTERN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TRAFFIC.

DETAILED AGREEMENTS ON OPERATION THEN COULD BE MADE AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH OR WITHOUT THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF THE EAST-WEST BIG FOUR POWERS. THOSE GOVERNMENTS ARE THE WEST GERMAN ADMINISTRATION, THE WEST BERLIN CITY ADMINISTRATION AND THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST REGIME WITH HEADQUARTERS IN EAST BERLIN.

KENNEDY'S COMMENT THAT HE THOUGHT A NATO-WARSAW PACT PEACE PLEDGE "WOULD BE HELPFUL" CAME AS SOMETHING OF A SURPRISE SINCE THE UNITED STATES HAS TRADITIONALLY OPPOSED PEACE DECLARATIONS WHICH APPEAR TO BE MEANINGLESS AND HAS ALSO TRIED TO AVOID RECOGNITION OF THE WARSAW PACT AS BEING IN ANY WAY THE EQUAL OF NATO. THE WARSAW GROUP IS COMPOSED OF SOVIET SATELLITE COUNTRIES TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

HOWEVER, OFFICIALS SAID THAT IF THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN PUBLISHING PEACE COMMITMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH BROAD NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE THE UNITED STATES WOULD GO ALONG.

KENNEDY, IT WAS SAID, IS NOT THINKING IN TERMS OF SIGNING A TREATY BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT GROUP SINCE THAT WOULD INVOLVE NEGOTIATION OF THE EAST GERMAN REGIME WHICH IS A MEMBER OF WARSAW. WHAT IS CONSIDERED POSSIBLE IS THE MAKING OF SIMULTANEOUS DECLARATIONS WHICH COULD BE WORKED OUT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE LEADING WESTERN POWERS.

THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO MAINTAINING A LIMITED NUMBER OF TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN WAS NOT DEVELOPED IN ANY WAY.

BUT HIS EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT THE NUMBER IS SMALL SUGGESTED THAT IN NEGOTIATIONS HE WOULD BE WILLING TO AGREE THAT THE NUMBER SHOULD BE KEPT SMALL.

THE PRESENT U. S.-BRITISH-FRENCH TOTAL IN WEST BERLIN IS ABOUT 11,000 OFFICERS AND MEN.

WE327PES

A67WX

IZVESTIA BACKGROUND (750)

BY WHITNEY SHOEMAKER

WASHINGTON, NOV. 28 (AP)-SOVIET PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV PERSONALLY APPROVED HIS SON-IN-LAW'S INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY, WHITE HOUSE SOURCES DISCLOSED TODAY.

A SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID KHRUSHCHEV FELT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR KENNEDY TO BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THE SOVIET PEOPLE THROUGH THE SOVIET PRESS.

THE LENGTHY INTERVIEW, WHICH CAME OUT IN IZVESTIA TODAY, RESULTED FROM A SERIES OF CONFERENCES BETWEEN WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY PIERRE SALINGER AND RUSSIAN SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING IZVESTIA EDITOR ALEXEI ADZHUBEI, BEGINNING LAST JUNE, IT WAS LEARNED.

KENNEDY WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN FULLY AWARE THAT ADZHUBEI WOULD INTERJECT HIS OWN COMMENTS ALONG WITH THE QUESTIONS HE ASKED IN THE INTERVIEW, WHICH TOOK PLACE LAST SATURDAY IN THE LIVING ROOM OF KENNEDY'S HYANNIS PORT, MASS., HOME. HE CONCURRED IN SALINGER'S THEORY THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS OWN VIEWS TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

ADZHUBEI, WHO BECAME EDITOR OF IZVESTIA AFTER MARRYING ONE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S DAUGHTERS, TOOK UP MORE THAN ONE-THIRD OF THE SPACE THE TRANSCRIPT OCCUPIED.

KENNEDY HIMSELF SAID TODAY HE FEELS PUBLICATION OF THE INTERVIEW FOR ALL RUSSIANS TO READ MARKED A STEP FORWARD IN DEALINGS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

ASKED IF HE BELIEVES ADZHUBEI'S RESPONSES OBSCURED KENNEDY'S COMMENTS, SALINGER SAID HE IS CONFIDENT KENNEDY "GOT ACROSS HIS VIEWS VERY CLEARLY." THROUGHOUT THE MONTHS-LONG DICKERING THAT RESULTED IN THE INTERVIEW, SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK WAS KEPT FULLY ADVISED.

WHITE HOUSE SOURCES REPORTED THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INTERVIEW, THE FIRST GRANTED BY A U.S. PRESIDENT TO A SOVIET NEWSMAN:

LAST JUNE 24, SALINGER APPEARED ON A DEBATE, TELEVISED FROM NEW YORK, WITH ADZHUBEI AND MIKHAIL KHARLAMOV, PRESS OFFICER FOR THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY. AFTER THE TELEVISED DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF THE PRESS, ADZHUBEI AND KHARLAMOV RETURNED TO WASHINGTON WITH SALINGER AND CHATTED WITH HIM THAT NIGHT AND THE NEXT DAY ABOUT WAYS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

THEY MENTIONED EXCHANGES OF NEWSMEN, EASING RESTRICTIONS ON REPORTERS, AND TRADING TELEVISION DOCUMENTARIES AND NEWSPAPER COLUMNS, AMONG OTHER THINGS. ALL PARTIES AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER.

KHARLAMOV, INCIDENTALLY, HAD SAID THE TELEVISED DEBATE (ON AN NBC SERIES) WOULD BE SHOWN IN RUSSIA. IT WAS NOT DONE, THE SOVIETS CONTENDING A KINESCOPE PROVIDED BY THE NETWORK COULD NOT BE ADAPTED TO RUSSIAN TV EQUIPMENT. U.S. SOURCES BELIEVE IT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE.

THE SOVIET PRESS DID CARRY STORIES ABOUT THE DEBATE. ADZHUBEI WAS QUOTED IN CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE U.S. PRESS, AND PRAVDA USED SOME OF SALINGER'S REMARKS ON THE VALUE OF IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS.

SOME TIME AFTER THE TELEVISION PROGRAM, KHRUSHCHEV DELIVERED A SPEECH IN WHICH HE SAID RUSSIA HAD ALWAYS STOOD FOR "EXPANSION OF CONTACTS IN VARIOUS FIELDS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN POWERS." KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO THE "USEFUL DISCUSSION" ON TELEVISION BETWEEN "SOVIET PRESS WORKERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN PRESS."

THE SOVIET PREMIER SAID HE APPRECIATED KENNEDY'S RECEIVING THOSE JOURNALISTS AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY DONE WITH ANOTHER GROUP OF SOVIET PRESS REPRESENTATIVES.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID THESE CONTACTS IMPROVED RELATIONS "AND WE WANT THIS COURSE TO CONTINUE FURTHER."

ON SEPT. 24, THE EVE OF KENNEDY'S UNITED NATIONS SPEECH, SALINGER MET IN NEW YORK WITH KHARLAMOV AND GEORGI BOLSHIKOV, WASHINGTON-BASED EDITOR OF U.S.S.R. THIS IS THE SOVIET MAGAZINE DISTRIBUTED IN the U.S. BOLSHIKOV LATER WAS TO SERVE AS ADZHUBEI'S INTERPRETER IN THE INTERVIEW WITH KENNEDY.

THE NEW YORK MEETING OCCURRED JUST AFTER THE NEW YORK TIMES HAD PUBLISHED AN INTERVIEW WITH KHRUSHCHEV BY C. L. SULZBERGER, ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COLUMNIST. SALINGER NOTED IN CONVERSATION WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT KHRUSHCHEV PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN ABLE TO PRESENT HIS VIEWS THROUGH INTERVIEWS WITH COLUMNISTS WALTER LIPPMAN AND DREW PEARSON. HE SAID NO AMERICAN PRESIDENT HAD BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE HIS IDEAS IN THAT MANNER TO THE RUSSIANS, BUT KENNEDY WAS INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY.

SALINGER THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE LEADING SOVIET EDITOR BE SENT TO THIS COUNTRY FOR THE PURPOSE.

KENNEDY WAS AWARE OF SALINGER'S APPROACH. THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE IDEA EXTENSIVELY.

KHARLAMOV SAID HE WOULD RELAY THE SUGGESTION TO MOSCOW ALONG WITH SALINGER'S URGING THAT A FULL TRANSCRIPT BE CARRIED IN THE SOVIET PRESS.

FIVE DAYS LATER, WHILE WITH KENNEDY AT NEWPORT, R.I., SALINGER WAS CONTACTED BY BOLSHIKOV AND THEY ARRANGED ANOTHER MEETING IN NEW YORK ON SEPT. 30.

IT WAS THEN THAT BOLSHIKOV INFORMED THE PRESS SECRETARY THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD TAKEN PERSONAL NOTE OF THE SUGGESTION AND FELT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA. BOLSHIKOV SAID EITHER ADZHUBEI OR ANOTHER LEADING SOVIET EDITOR WOULD BE SENT TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. TWO WEEKS LATER BOLSHIKOV CALLED SALINGER IN WASHINGTON AND SAID ADZHUBEI WOULD BE THE MAN.

ADZHUBEI WAS IN WASHINGTON NOV. 20, THE MONDAY BEFORE THE INTERVIEW AT HYANNIS PORT, AND DISCUSSED MECHANICS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH SALINGER AT THE PRESS SECRETARY'S HOME. ADZHUBEI ASSURED SALINGER HE WOULD PUBLISH THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT.

ADZHUBEI OFFERED TO ASK ANY QUESTION KENNEDY WOULD LIKE TO ANSWER, BUT WAS TOLD TO ASK WHATEVER HE HIMSELF CHOSE. WHEN ADZHUBEI ARRIVED AT KENNEDY'S HYANNIS PORT HOME, HIS QUESTIONS WERE TYPED IN SOVIET CHARACTERS ON WHITE CARDS. BOLSHIKOV ALREADY HAD THEM DOWN ON SEPARATE SHEETS IN ENGLISH TO RELAY TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE SOVIET PEOPLE READ THE ANSWERS TODAY.

CZ&EG606PES

A6WX

INTERVIEW-TRANSLATION (260)

WASHINGTON, NOV. 28 (AP)-THE INTERVIEW BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND ALEXEI ADZHUBEI WAS CARRIED IN FULL IN THE SOVIET PAPER IZVESTIA, WITH ONE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE, THE WHITE HOUSE SAID TODAY.

PIERRE SALINGER, WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, GAVE THIS WORD TO NEWSMEN. HE SAID HE WAS INFORMED A CHANGE WAS MADE IN THE TRANSCRIPT WHERE ADZHUBEI, EDITOR OF IZVESTIA, WAS ASKING A QUESTION ABOUT A PACT OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

ADZHUBEI HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE VISIT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1959.

"BUT UNFORTUNATELY THE RULTS OF THAT TRIP WERE NOT COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY," HE IS QUOTED IN THE VERSION GIVEN OUT IN WASHINGTON.

ACCORDING TO WORD SALINGER RECEIVED FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, THAT SENTENCE WAS CHANGED TO READ "BUT THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF THAT TRIP WERE WRECKED AND BROUGHT TO NOTHING BY THE WELL KNOWN ACTIONS OF THE THEN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION."

THE INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE AT HYANNIS PORT, MASS., LAST SATURDAY, WITH ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND GEORGI BOLSHIKOV, A RUSSIAN EDITOR, ACTING AS INTERPRETERS.

A TRANSACRIPT IN ENGLISH WAS TAKEN DOWN BY JACK ROMAGNA, WHITE HOUSE SHORTHAND EXPERT. AKALOVSKY AND BOLSHIKOV TOOK THIS TO NEW YORK SATURDAY NIGHT AND TRANSLATED IT INTO RUSSIAN. THEN THE DOCUMENT WAS RE-TRANSLATED BACK INTO ENGLISH IN ORDER TO GET THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH VERSIONS.

30.24-2373

AGREEMENT ON THE RUSSIAN AND [illegible]
THEN THERE WERE FURTHER CONFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS WHICH LED TO AGREEMENT ON EVERY WORD, OFFICIALS HERE SAID. AFTER THIS, THE INTERVIEW WAS CABLED TO MOSCOW.

PE129PES

A114WA
(120) INTERVIEW-VOICE
WASHINGTON, NOV. 28 (AP)-THE U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY REPORTED TODAY THAT VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS CONTAINING HIGHLIGHTS OF THE IZVESTIA INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY WENT UNJAMMED INTO THE SOVIET UNION.
VOA, THE U. S. PROPAGANDA RADIO SERVICE, IS GIVING THE KENNEDY INTERVIEW WIDE DISTRIBUTION IN ALL AREAS AND LANGUAGES, INCLUDING RUSSIAN BEAMED TO THE SOVIET UNION.
THE THREE BROADCASTS IN RUSSIAN THIS AFTERNOON WERE NOT JAMMED, ACCORDING TO SPOT CHECKS, A VOA SPOKESMAN SAID. ONLY ABOUT 2 MINUTES OF THE 30-MINUTE PROGRAM IN RUSSIAN WERE JAMMED AND THAT WAS DURING A DISCUSSION OF THE GENEVA NUCLEAR TEST BAN TALKS, WHICH REOPENED TODAY.
THE SPOKESMAN SAID VOA HIGHLIGHTED ITS BROADCAST WITH KENNEDY'S STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD LIVE IN PEACE IF MOSCOW RECOGNIZED THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL PEOPLES.

EG935PES

A90
KENNEDY REACTION
BERLIN, NOV. 28 (AP)-COMMUNIST EAST GERMANY'S OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY ADN TONIGHT CARRIED A SHARPLY EDITED VERSION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S INTERVIEW WITH IZVESTIA.
THE ADN VERSION HAD FEW DIRECT QUOTATIONS.
IT MENTIONED THE PRESIDENT'S EXPRESSED HOPE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION COULD BE IMPROVED THROUGH AN AGREEMENT ON GERMANY AND BERLIN.
BUT IT OMITTED KENNEDY'S REFERENCES TO THE WALL DIVIDING BERLIN AND OTHER REMARKS ON BERLIN.
THE ADN SUMMARY GAVE MORE SPACE TO OTHER QUESTIONS, SUCH AS DISARMAMENT, THAN IT DID TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM.

UK730PES

ALEXEI ADZHUBEI, WHO GOT THE HISTORIC INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY, IS A PLUMPISH, BLONDISH, 36-YEAR-OLD SOVIET JOURNALIST WHO BEARS A RESEMBLANCE TO HIS FAMOUS FATHER-IN-LAW, PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV.

ADZHUBEI TOOK OVER AS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER IZVESTIA IN 1959 AFTER MARRYING KHRUSHCHEV'S DAUGHTER JULIA. HE PREVIOUSLY EDITED A SOVIET YOUTH ORGANIZATION PAPER.

THE PUBLICATION HE NOW HEADS IS THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE RULING PRESIDIUM OF THE SOVIET UNION SUPREME SOVIET--IN EFFECT, THE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER. THE NAME IZVESTIA MEANS NEWS. IT CLAIMS MORE THAN A MILLION CIRCULATION.

IZVESTIA IS ONE OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL NEWSPAPERS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE OTHER IS PRAVDA, WHICH MEANS TRUTH. IT IS THE ORGAN OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY.

BY WESTERN STANDARDS BOTH PAPERS ARE DULL IN APPEARANCE. SINCE ADZHUBEI TOOK OVER IZVESTIA THE PAPER'S FACE HAS BRIGHTENED UP A BIT, WITH A NEW MAKEUP, PUNCHIER HEADLINES AND MORE AND BIGGER PICTURES. IT'S A DAILY AND RUNS TO SIX PAGES.

JK655PES

A28 (500)
AMS BUDGET
NIGHT LEAD NUCLEAR
BY MICHAEL GOLDSMITH
GENEVA, NOV. 28 (AP)-THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN TODAY REJECTED AS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE A NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN UNCONTROLLED NUCLEAR TEST BAN.
U.S. DELEGATE ARTHUR DEAN DECLARED THE SOVIET MOTTO "SEEMS TO BE 'LET'S ALL JOIN ATOMIC ANONYMOUS UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION WANTS TO FALL OFF THE NO-TEST WAGON AND TEST AGAIN.'"
SOVIET DELEGATE SEMYON K. TSARAPKINDECLARED THE SOVIET UNION IS NO LONGER PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY KIND OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN.
THUS A STALEMATE OVER THE OLD ISSUE OF CONTROLS DEVELOPED AT THE THREE POWERS' FIRST SESSION IN 2 1/2 MONTHS. THE TALKS WERE RECESSED IN SEPTEMBER WHEN THE SOVIET UNION BROKE A VOLUNTARY THREE-POWER MORATORIUM BY RESUMING TESTS.
THE FIRM POSITIONS OF THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO PUT A FINAL SEAL ON FAILURE OF THE THREE NATIONS TO DRAFT A TEST BAN TREATY. BUT NEITHER SIDE TOOK ANY IMMEDIATE INITIATIVE FOR BREAKING OFF THE TALKS. THEY AGREED TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW.
TSARAPKIN ALSO ASKED THE TWO WESTERN POWERS TO AGREE TO INVITE FRANCE TO JOIN THE TALKS. THIS, TOO, WAS REJECTED BY THE WEST -- UNLESS FRANCE ASKS TO COME.
FRANCE BECAME A NUCLEAR POWER AFTER THE NEGOTIATIONS OPENED IN OCTOBER, 1958, BUT HAS NEVER EXPRESSED ANY DESIRE TO JOIN THE TEST BAN TALKS.
DEAN TOLD NEWSMEN: "IF WE CALL IN FRANCE, IT WOULD MEAN STARTING ALL OVER AGAIN. OF COURSE, IF THEY WANT TO COME IN, WE WOULD BE VERY GLAD TO HAVE THEM."
DURING THE CLOSED MEETING, DEAN PLAYED THE SOVIET PLAN, DESCRIBING IT AS A "TRANSPARENT PROPAGANDA GESTURE PUT FORWARD IN A VAIN HOPE TO MISLEAD AND DECEIVE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION."
HE SAID IT WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND WAS A DEVICE TO PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM CONDUCTING NUCLEAR TESTS AFTER THE HUGE SOVIET TEST SERIES IN SIBERIA. HE DECLARED THE PLAN THREW OVERBOARD EVERY COMMITMENT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE IN 341 NEGOTIATING SESSIONS.
DEAN REPEATED THAT THE WEST WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY TREATY WITHOUT PROVISIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL--PARTICULARLY AFTER THE SOVIET TEST SERIES HAD DISPELLED ANY INCLINATION TO TAKE THE RUSSIANS AT THEIR WORD.
"A TEST BAN WITHOUT EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS IS NO BAN AT ALL," HE SAID. "IT IS ONLY A DECLARATION WHICH CANNOT BE ENFORCED."

KS&P305PES

IN VIEW OF THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES, IT APPEARED LIKELY THE DELEGATES WOULD QUICKLY DECIDE TO REPORT BACK TO THE UNITED NATIONS THEIR INABILITY TO REACH ANY KIND OF AGREEMENT.

DEAN TOLD NEWSMEN THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT PLANNING TO SUBMIT ANY NEW PROPOSAL.

THE THREE DELEGATIONS RESUMED THEIR THREE-YEAR-OLD TALKS AT THE REQUEST OF AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

ACTING U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT, IN A MESSAGE TO THE CONFERENCE,SAID "THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL WILL REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT FORWARD STEP IN THE REALIZATION OF THE GOALS FOR WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS WAS ESTABLISHED."

IMMEDIATELY AFTER BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE JOSEPH GODBER, CHAIRMAN FOR THE DAY, HAD READ U THANT'S MESSAGE, TSARAPKIN FORMALLY SUBMITTED THE NEW SOVIET PLAN.

THE PLAN CALLED FOR A TOTAL BAN ON ALL TESTS WITHOUT ANY INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

THERE WOULD BE A DISCUSSION OF CONTROLS IF AND WHEN THE GREAT POWERS CAN AGREE ON TOTAL ABOLITION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THIS SOVIET PLAN OF COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IS REGARDED BY THE WEST AS UNREALISTIC

A93WX(ESPIONAGE)

(380) GERMAN-ESPIONAGE

WASHINGTON, NOV. 28 (AP)-THE STATE DEPARTMENT CHARGED TODAY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SATELLITES ARE USING EAST BERLIN AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR THEIR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST WEST GERMANY AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN WORLD.

IN ADDITION, THE DEPARTMENT SAID, THE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BASED IN EAST BERLIN ARE USED TO KIDNAP AND ASSASSINATE POLITICAL ENEMIES OF THE COMMUNISTS.

THE DEPARTMENT ISSUED A LENGTHY AND DETAILED REVIEW OF COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN EAST GERMANY AND THE SOVIET SECTOR OF BERLIN. THE STUDY WAS MADE PUBLIC IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEFECTION OF GUENTER MAENNEL, A FORMER EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST AGENT.

MAENNEL, DESCRIBED AS A SENIOR OFFICER OF THE EAST GERMAN SECRET SERVICE, DEFECTED JUNE 29, 1961. BONN DISPATCHES SAID HE WAS THE CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DESK OF HVA (CAPS), THE EAST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATING OUTSIDE EAST GERMANY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT DESCRIBED HIM AS A SENIOR LIEUTENANT OF HVA.

HVA, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID, IS HEADED BY BRIGADIER MARKUS WOLF, A SOVIET CITIZEN OF GERMAN BIRTH.

THE SOVIET UNION, IN DEMANDING THAT WEST BERLIN BE MADE A "FREE" CITY, HAS REPEATEDLY CHARGED THAT WEST BERLIN IS A CENTER OF ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSION.

MAENNEL'S STATEMENT IN GERMANY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE "RECENT SOVIET PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON WEST BERLIN ARE SHEER HYPOCRISY," THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID.

THE DEPARTMENT'S DOCUMENT, SAID EAST BERLIN AND GERMANY'S SOVIET ZONE HAVE BECOME THE "RALLYING GROUND FOR ALMOST EVERY ESPIONAGE ORGANIZATION" IN THE COMMUNIST ORBIT.

HEADQUARTERS OF ALL COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE ORGANS IS IN KARLSHORST, IN EAST BERLIN, THE STUDY SAID. NOT ONLY EAST GERMANY BUT ALSO THE SOVIET UNION, ALL EUROPEAN SATELLITES,--EXCEPT ALBANIA--AND ALSO RED CHINA AND NORTH KOREA HAVE ESPIONAGE SERVICES IN EAST BERLIN.

AMONG THE CASES DETAILED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT WAS ON INVOLVING A FORMER SECOND SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, WHO WAS "UNOFFICIALLY" ASKED TO LEAVE THIS COUNTRY IN 1959.

THIS MAN, IDENTIFIED BY THE DEPARTMENT AS YEVGENIY A. ZAOSTROVTSEV, WAS SAID TO HAVE ARRANGED A PLOT TO LURE AN AMERICAN WOMAN TO EAST BERLIN EARLY THIS YEAR IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO ENMESH HER IN ESPIONAGE WORK FOR THE SOVIETS.

AS RECOUNTED IN THE REPORT, THE YOUNG WOMAN WAS EMPLOYED BY THE U.S. FORCES IN GERMANY AND THE SOVIET PLOTTERS HOPED TO PERSUADE HER TO STEAL CODED TELEGRAMS FROM HER OFFICE FOR THEM BY INVOLVING HER FIRST IN "A COMPROMISING SITUATION" WITH A YOUNG RED AGENT POSING AS AN AMERICAN. SHE WAS IDENTIFIED ONLY AS ELEANOR.

CR745PES

A18

AMS BUDGET (340)

NIGHT LEAD CHINA-SOVIET

BY JOHN RODERICK

TOKYO, NOV. 28 (AP)-MAO TZE-TUNG JOINED OTHER CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS TODAY IN SINGING THE PRAISES OF ALBANIA IN WHAT APPEARED A DELIBERATE AFFRONT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV.

MAO, RED CHINA'S LEADER, AND OTHER OFFICIALS SENT A MESSAGE TO ALBANIA PRAISING THE ALBANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AS "LOYAL TO MARXISM-LENINISM AND THE...UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT," RADIO PEIPING SAID.

IT BECAME CLEAR AT THE SOVIET CONGRESS IN MOSCOW LAST MONTH THAT WHEN THE CHINESE REDS DEFENDED THE IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS OF ALBANIAN COMMUNIST LEADER ENVER HOXHA IT AMOUNTED TO AN ATTACK ON KHRUSHCHEV. THE SOVIET PREMIER HAD DENOUNCED ALBANIA'S RED LEADERS FOR STALINISM.

THE DEPTH OF THE IDEOLOGICAL QUARREL BETWEEN THE TWO GIANTS OF COMMUNISM WAS UNDERSCORED BY THE CHINESE STATEMENT AND A RIVAL ONE ISSUED IN MOSCOW ON THIS 17TH ANNIVERSARY OF ALBANIA'S LIBERATION FROM THE NAZIS.

IN MOSCOW, WITH THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS SAID THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WERE SENDING GREETINGS TO THE PEOPLE OF ALBANIA, BUT IT ACCUSED THE LEADERS OF THE TINY COUNTRY ON THE ADRIATIC OF "DANGEROUS ACTIONS DAMAGING THE UNITY OF THE ENTIRE SOCIALIST (COMMUNIST) COMMONWEALTH."

THE MESSAGE FROM MAO PRAISED HOXHA FOR "UNFLINCHING HEROISM" AND FOR OVERCOMING "ENEMIES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY IN THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM." IT SAID THE CHINESE AND ALBANIAN COMMUNISTS JOIN IN A STRUGGLE AGAINST "MODERN REVISIONISM" AND "SUPPORT EACH OTHER AND COOPERATE CLOSELY."

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST HAVE FREQUENTLY USED THE TERM "MODERN REVISIONISM" TO INDICATE UNHAPPINESS ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV'S LEADERSHIP.

OTHER CHINESE LEADERS WHO SIGNED THE GREETINGS WERE LIU SHAO-CHI, CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI.

PEIPING'S OFFICIAL PEOPLE'S DAILY ALSO LAUNCHED NEW ASSAULTS ON THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST PARTY UNDER PRESIDENT TITO, ACCUSING IT OF TRAITOROUS DEALINGS IN OPPOSING THE SOCIALIST CAMP.

THE PAPER SCORED "THE TITO CLIQUE" THAT "BITTERLY HATES ALBANIA" BECAUSE IT HAS "ADHERED TO SOCIALISM, RESOLUTELY OPPOSED IMPERIALISM AND CEASELESSLY EXPOSED THE COUNTENANCE OF THE YUGOSLAV MODERN REVISIONISTS AS RENEGADES." THOSE WORDS SEEMED AIMED AT KHRUSHCHEV TOO.

PEIPING RADIO SAID, HOWEVER, LIU SENT A MESSAGE TO TITO ON THE OCCASION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S NATIONAL DAY TO "EXPRESS GREETINGS TO YOU AND THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE AND WISH THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE HAPPINESS."

MC219PES

A138WX

(350) SUBMARINES

WAETINGTON, NOV. 28 (AP)-ADM. GEORGE W. ANDERSON JR. SAID TODAY THE THREAT OF A MISSILE ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES FROM RUSSIAN SUBMARINES IS OF "LIMITED SCOPE AT THE PRESENT TIME."

BUT THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS SAID THE UNITED STATS WILL FACE A SERIOUS THREAT IF THE RUSSIANS DEVELOP A SYSTEM LIKE THE U. S. POLARIS SUBMARINE WITH ITS ROCKETS OF BETTER THAN 1,200-MILE RANGE, ABLE TO BE FIRED FROM BELOW THE OCEAN SURFACE.

"TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THE SUBMARINES THE RUSSIANS HAVE THAT MIGHT BE USED TO LAUNCH MISSILES AGAINST US...ARE...OF LIMITED NUMBER," ANDERSON TOLD THE WASHINGTON AERO CLUB.

FURTHERMORE, THE NAVY'S TOP ADMIRAL SAID RUSSIAN SUBMARINE-FIRED MISSILES ARE OF LIMITED RANGE AND MUST BE LAUNCHED FROM THE SURFACE WHERE THE SUBMARINES ARE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK.

AS FOR THE POLARIS SUBMARINE, ANDERSON SAID THERE IS "NOTHING THAT CAN COMPARED WITH IT IN THE WORLD TODAY IN RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE."

THE UNITED STATES NOW HAS SIX NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES WITH THE FLEET, AND IS BUILDING TOWARD A FORCE OF 29 BOATS BY THE END OF 1964. RECENTLY, ANDERSON SAID THE NAVY IS SHOOTING FOR AN ULTIMATE GOAL OF ABOUT 50 POLARIS SUBS.

EACH POLARIS CRAFT IS ARMED WITH 16 MISSILES, AND THE UNITED STATES IS DEVELOPING A LONGER RANGE MODEL THAN THE ROCKET NOW IN USE.

ANDRSON SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH SKIPPERS OF POLARIS SUBMARINES WHICH HAD RETURNED FROM PATROL AND THAT THE CRAFT HAD RACKED UP A "TRULY FANTASTIC RECORD OF RELIABILITY OF ALMOST 100 PER CENT READINESS" IN ALL THE WEAPONS THEY CARRY.

LAST WEEKEND, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JOHN B. CONNALLY SAID THAT IN RECENT SUBMERGED FIRINGS POLARIS SUBS HAD RUN UP "THE FANTASTIC SCORE OF 10 OUT OF 10 PERFECT SHOTS."

THE RUSSIANS ARE CREDITED WITH A FORMIDABLE FLEET OF PERHAPS 450 SUBMARINES, MOSTLY CONVENTIONALLY POWERED. THEY HAVE CLAIMED THE WORLD'S FASTEST FLEET OF NUCLEAR UNDERSEA CRAFT BUT THE U. S. NAVY SCOFFED AT THE CLAIM.

ANDERSON SAID U. S. ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES RUN THE "FULL GAMUT OF NAVAL POWER," INCLUDING SURFACE SHIPS, AIRPLANES AND SUBMARINES.

"WE HAVE A CONSIDERABLE CAPABILITY OF PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES FROM MISSILE ATTACK" FROM THE SEA, THE NAVY CHIEF ASSERTED.

WHILE CONCEDING THAT CAPABILITY IS NOT 100 PER CENT, ANDERSON SAID THERE IS "NO DOUBT IN MY MIND" THAT THE NAVY WILL BE ABLE TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEM IN A VERY SATISFACTORY MANNER.

GG1056PES

A110WA

M(220) MILLER

WASHINGTON, NOV. 28 (AP)-REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CHAIRMAN WILLIAM E. MILLER SAID TODAY THE WESTERN ALLIES SHOULD HAVE KICKED THE BERLIN WALL DOWN AS IT WAS BEING BUILT, BRICK BY BRICK.

"I THINK THAT WEST BERLIN NO LONGER HAS ANY MEANING," MILLER SAID "I THINK THAT MR. KHRUSHCHEV IS NOT INTERESTED IN OUR OCCUPATION OF WEST BERLIN."

MILLER WAS ASKED IN A PRE-RECORDED RADIO INTERVIEW (WESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING CO.'S "WASHINGTON VIEWPOINT") WHETHER HE AGREED WITH SOME MEMBERS OF HIS OWN PARTY THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD INSIST THAT THE WALL COME DOWN BEFORE IT BEGINS NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS OVER BERLIN.

"THAT," HE REPLIED, "WOULD BE A QUESTION, I THINK, THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE LEFT NOW TO THIS ADMINISTRATION, HAVING PERMITTED ITS ERECTION, TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT'S PART OF THE OVER-ALL PICTURE...

"BUT I CERTAINLY THINK THAT NO WAR WOULD HAVE BEEN STARTED HAD WE PREVENTED THE ERECTION OF THE WALL FROM THE VERY INCEPTION."

RESPONDING TO OTHER QUESTIONS, MILLER SAID:

1. HE AGREED WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY, IN GENERAL, IN HIS ATTACK ON EXTREMISTS OF RIGHT AND LEFT, BUT SAID IF KENNEDY "TURNS AROUND IN HIS ROCKING CHAIR, HE'LL FIND MORE EXTREMISTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE THAN ANY PLACE ELSE."

2. THE IMPENDING DIVORCE OF GOV. NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER OF NEW YORK AND HIS WIFE WILL NOT BE AN IMPORTANT OR DECISIVE FACTOR IN ROCKEFELLER'S POLITICAL FUTURE.

MILLER SAID IF ROCKEFELLER CONTINUES TO BE A FINE GOVERNOR HE WILL BE RE-ELECTED OVERWHELMINGLY. HE ADDED: "AND IF HE IS, AS GOVERNOR OF THE MOST POPULOUS STATE, HE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A POWER IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY."

EG912PES

30.24-2375

A120 150

BONN, GERMANY, NOV. 28 (AP)-THE CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DESK IN EAST GERMANY'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT HAS FLED TO THE WEST, THE WEST GERMAN INTERIOR MINISTRY ANNOUNCED TODAY.

THE DEFECTION OF 30-YEAR-OLD GUENTHER MAENNEL, THE MINISTRY SAID, REVEALED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT EAST GERMANY HAS BEEN MAKING EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A SPY NETWORK IN THE UNITED STATES.

AN OFFICIAL SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF MAENNEL'S DEFECTION "MOST OF THE AGENTS SENT OUT TO PENETRATE THE UNITED STATES HAVE ALREADY BEEN NEUTRALIZED."

IT'S BELIEVED THE EAST GERMANS HAD NOT ACTUALLY PLACED AN AGENT ON U.S. SOIL, BUT HAD OPERATIVES THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA WHOSE TARGETS WERE U.S. INTERESTS AND WHO WERE TO HAVE WORKED SLOWLY TOWARD ENTERING THE UNITED STATES.

ONE AGENT, ARRESTED IN SAO PAULO, BRAZIL, LAST JULY, WAS IDENTIFIED AS JOSEPH WERNER LEBEN. WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS SAID HE WAS FOUND IN POSSESSION OF CODES AND CIPERS AND CHEMICALLY TREATED STATIONARY USED IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIS EAST GERMAN SUPERIORS.

OFFICIALS SAID MAENNEL GAVE WESTERN COUNTERSPIES VALUABLE DETAILS ON ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AIMED AT PENETRATING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BONN AND VARIOUS U.S. CONSULATES IN WEST GERMANY.

ONE AGENT, IDENTIFIED AS SYBILLE WAMBACH, REPORTEDLY WORKED IN THE HOME OF A U.S. AIR FORCE MAJOR IN MUNICH AND, OFFICIALS SAID, REPORTED IN THE SPRING OF 1958 THAT U.S. PARATROOPS AND THE 7TH ARMY HAD BEEN ALERTED FOR ACTION IN LEBANON. THE U.S. DID SEND FORCES INTO LEBANON IN THE SUMMER OF 1958. MISS WAMBACH WAS SAID TO HAVE ESCAPED ARREST LAST JUNE BY FLEEING TO EAST BERLIN.

KS1024AES

A83 (300) (DT F)

BERLIN, NOV. 28 (AP)- YOUNG MAN CLAIMING TO BE THE LEADING MALE DANCER OF THE BUCHAREST, ROMANIA, STATE OPERA BALLET HAS DEFECTED FROM EAST BERLIN, AN AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE SAID TODAY.

THE DEBONAIR YOUNG MAN REPORTEDLY CROSSED INTO WEST BERLIN IN MID-NOVEMBER AND IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS GELU BARBU, 28. HE WAS QUOTED AS SAYING HE WANTED TO BREATHE FREE AIR AND WAS "FED UP WITH BEING JUST A CULTURAL SHOWPIECE FOR THE COMMUNISTS."

THE DANCER WAS REPORTED IN TOUCH WITH AMERICAN AUTHORITIES IN WEST BERLIN. DETAILS WERENOT AVAILABLE ON HOW HE MADE HIS REPORTED ESCAPE FROM A ROMANIAN TROUPE WHICH HAS BEEN PERFORMING IN EAST BERLIN HE WAS SAID TO BE HOPEFUL OF GOING TO NEW YORK.

A WEST BERLIN NEWSPAPER QUOTED BARBU AS SAYING HE HAD STUDIED WITH THE LENINGRAD BALLET AND HAD DANCED ON THE BOLSHOI STAGE IN MOSCOW, AS WELL AS IN POLAND, BULGARIA, INDIA, INDONESIA AND EGYPT. THEY SAID HE LEFT HIS PARENTS IN BUCHAREST.

THE DANCER ALSO REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THOUSANDS OF JEWS WANT TO MIGRATE FROM COMMUNIST ROMANIA TO ISRAEL BUT THAT THE RISKS AND HARDSHIPS ARE TOO GREAT. APPLYING FOR AN EXIT PERMIT MEANS GIVING UP ONE'S BUSINESS IMMEDIATELY AND WAITING FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR.

ACCORDING TO BARBU.

INFORMATION BUREAU WEST, AN UNOFFICIAL WEST BERLIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, REPORTED TODAY THAT DR. HELMUTH KLEINSORGE, DIRECTOR OF THE CLINIC AND PROFESSOR OF INTERNAL MEDICINE AT FRIEDRICH-SCHILLER UNIVERSITY IN JENA, HAD FLED BECAUSE HIS CONSCIENCE WOULD NOT LET HIM CONTINUE TEACHING UNDER COMMUNISM.

KLEINSORGE WAS ONCE DECORATED WITH A BRONZE MEDAL BY THE EAST GERMAN REGIME, INFORMATION BUREAU WEST SAID.

WEST BERLIN POLICE SAID SIX CIVILIANS AND TWO ARMED EAST GERMAN BORDER GUARDS ESCAPED TO THE WESTDURING THE PASH 24 HOURS. THREE OTHERS TRYING TO ESCAPE WERE CAUGHT BY THE EAST BERLIN POLICE.
JT743AES